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Government Expenditure by Economic
and Functional Categories
WEhavenow established that the secular growth in British government
expenditures relative to GNP, and the pattern of displacement in that
growth, cannot be completely explained by the "permanent" influences
affecting government spending, or by the direct effects of war in making
increased expenditures continuously necessary, or by these two influences
operating together. We shall next examine the data from other points of
view, in order to discover what further characteristics of the displace-
ment effect have been important to the nature and timing of expenditure
growth. To do this, we shall have to examine the statistics of government
expenditure classified by economic categories(capital and current
expenditure, goods and services, and transfer expenditure) and according
to function, and try to account for the behavior of the statistics when so
classified.
We hope with these reclassified statistics to learn something about the
indirect effects of wars on government expenditures. However, the
indirect character of these effects makes for difficulties in interpretation.
The statement that an increase in war pension payments after a major
war was "caused" by that war is unlikely to mislead anyone seriously.
But can we say with equal clarity that the British Health Service, for
example, was the consequence of World War 11—inviting the inference that
had the war not occurred, the Service would not have come into existence?
This difficulty was explained in Chapter 2. The impact of social
disturbances upon the enduring level of public expenditures must be
seen as the consequence both of the displacement effect generated by the
disturbances (in releasing governments from the "bonds of the revenue,"
in creating new social ideas, and in stimulating innovation in the fiscal
system) and of the pre-existent socioeconomic environment in which the
disturbances occur. That is, the consequences of wars, for example, are
dual in nature; they change the society in which they occur, but are
themselves conditioned by the existing characteristics of that society. It
is clear, therefore, that we must place our statistics against a background
which brings out the relevant facts of history, bearing particularly upon
the control of public expenditures and upon the attitudes of government
and people to the functions of government and hence to the mechanics
of such control.
"Expenditure Depends upon Policy"
We believe that the displacement effect of wars upon government
expenditures, insofar as it is not explicable by changes of the kind dis-
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cussed in the last chapter, must be the consequence of the wartime
weakening of checks that inhibit the rate of growth of public spending in
more normal times. Clearly, therefore, the importance of the displace-
ment effect at any time depends partly upon the government's attitude
toward public expenditures, which will influence its willingness to take
advantage of the opportunities for expansion created by war, and partly
upon how war affects the government's permanent ability to raise revenues,
either by the changes it induces in the ideas of citizens as to what is
tolerable or by its effects upon the technical scope of the government's
revenue-raising activities. Associated with these influences, but distinct
and important enough to require separate consideration, is the fact that
the growth and pattern of expenditure may also be affected by changes
in political organization which touch upon the control of expenditure.
In each of these three respects—attitudes toward public expenditures,
war-induced changes in social ideas about tax burdens and in technical
revenue-increasing possibilities, and changes in political organization—
the British economy has seen important developments over the last
century.
The secular rate of growth of government expenditures relative to
GNP during our period is in striking contrast with the relative rate
earlier in the nineteenth century. Perhaps the contrast can be explained
in part by the absence in the earlier period of major social disturbances,
other than the Napoleonic Wars, and by the fact that the rapid rate of
growth in community output in the second half of the century gave scope for
increasing the absolute size of government expenditures without the need
to increase the share of the public sector in total output. But, this leaves
unexplained the apparent failure of even the Napoleonic Wars to cause
any observable permanent increase in the share of government. It might
be argued that a displacement effect did occur but cannot be seen in the
global statistics because of the great importance of debt interest payments
in that period. Thus, when debt payments were later reduced after being
inflated by the Napoleonic Wars, there was no equivalent fall in total
expenditure, but some of the "slack" so created was taken up by increases
in expenditures of other kinds. In the light of the statistics and reasoning
set forth in Chapter 3, such an argument is plausible. But it does not
provide a complete explanation of the difference between the periods.
There have also been important developments in the attitude of the
government to public spending. Minimization of expenditures was an
aim widely accepted in Parliament in the nineteenth century, and Parlia-
mentary differences were concerned rather with the methods to be used
to raise revenues. This attitude to expenditures, exemplified in the view
held by Gladstone and others that it was "a rule of finance that govern-
ments should reduce their expenditures," stemmed from a particular
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interpretation of the concept that "expenditure determines policy."
This statement, admittedly a truism, has been of great importance in
the practical development of the British system of public finance. Its
application as a doctrine of policy falls Into two distinct periods, in which
it was interpreted first as a concept of retrenchment and later as a doctrine
of expansionist public finance. There was of course never complete agree-
ment with either interpretation. On the one hand, there was always
some opposition to the philosophy of retrenchment from those who gave
at least limited support to what Harcourt castigated as "the fatalistic
doctrine of progressive taxation." On the other hand, as late as the third
decade of the twentieth century, when Harcourt's views had fallen
generally into disfavor, Hilton Young (Lord Kennet) could still write in
a well-known book that "all the financial operations of the State are an
unmitigated evil which is, unluckily, necessary. It is an evil, although a
necessary one, that the State should have to collect and spend a revenue.
A tax is a bad thing and not a good thing.... Could we do without
taxes altogether, we should all be better off."2 But despite these exceptions,
it is reasonably clear that until about the 1880's "expenditure determines
policy" was for practical purposes a doctrine of retrenchment, and that
it thereafter became a justification for the expansion of the public sector.
The doctrine of retrenchment did not, however, derive simply from an
objection to "wasteful expenditure"; it was an operating principle of
public finance and depended upon a particular theory of employment
and the conclusions of that theory for tax policy.2a Incomes should be left
large enough for people to meet their needs; taxes (i.e., indirect taxes)
impose a burden upon productive industry and in so doing induce
unemployment and poverty. Such a view, dependent as it is upon a
deficient theory of the economic consequences of taxation and public
expenditures, led naturally to the proposition that government expenditures
should be kept to the minimum, and that economy rather than any con-
ception of efficiency should be the yardstick for deciding upon any change
in tax and expenditure policy.3 InGladstone's words, "the cost of any policy
would generally be about the sole element in deciding its desirability."
1Itis also well illustrated by Bright's abortive motion of 1870 that the budget should
have an absolute limit of £70 million.
2E.Hilton Young, The System of National Finance, London, 1924, Chapter X, p. 221.
2aSeeB. A. Cony, "The Theory of the Economic Effects of Government Expenditure
in English Classical Political Economy," Economica, February 1958.
3Thereis evidence that the notion of efficiency was considered as a positive threat to
wise administration. Thus, Sir Winston Churchill writes of expenditure on military
services "It may begin in all individual earnestness in a simple demand for the reduction
of expenditure. That is the first stage. But in the process of the controversy, the movement
has been insensibly and irresistibly deflected from the original object. It began in a cry
for economy; it has become a cry for efficiency. That is the second stage. The third stage
becomes an agitation in favour of an increase of expenditure and a more lavish establish-
ment." Lord Randolph Churchill, new ed., London, 1952, Vol. II, p. 313.
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Together with this general attitude, the doctrine of retrenchment
incorporated a special element which is of peculiar interest from our
point of view. This is the importance attached by the proponents of
retrenchment to the consequences of war. They saw the possibility that
the large expenditures necessitated by wars would be continued after-
wards, because the government could always find uses for the extra money,
and they regarded this as a danger to be guarded against. The doctrine
of retrenchment thus not only helps to explain the slow secular growth of
government expenditures when ideas of retrenchment prevailed as com-
pared with later years, but also provides a reason why the displacement
effect of wars should be less marked than it has since become; there was a
demand in Parliament for restriction of the extent to which government
revenues and expenditures should be allowed to be permanently in-
fluenced by war.
Dissatisfaction with the doctrine of retrenchment, and a new inter-
pretation of "expenditure depends upon policy," developed in the l880's,
at the beginning of our period. Retrenchment was itself becoming a less
plausible doctrine intellectually with the growth in importance of the
income tax. This "temporary," almost accidental by-product of the repeal
of the Corn Laws drove those who continued to inveigh against growing
taxes and expenditures to shift their ground, first to the unsatisfactory
effects of the income tax on enterprise and then to the wider discussion
of concepts of taxable capacity. At the same time, a philosophy of ex-
pansion was being positively encouraged by the growth of the idea that
government spending might actually generate incomes. This, in turn,
was clearly related to the growth of "popular democracy" following the
widening of the franchise in 1884, and to a wider interpretation of the
functions of government. By the 1890's, Harcourt, whose support for
retrenchment persisted, was saying that "a Chancellor preaching against
extravagance is the voice of one crying in the wilderness," and Goschen
could dismiss objections to the growth of expenditure simply as "bunkum."
The era of "social socialism" had begun; there could be no more complete
contrast with Gladstonian finance than Lloyd George's assertion in 1908
that "No one need be afraid of any taxes being taken off in my time."
Prophetically, some Fabian socialists saw these developments in state
activity as a danger to the growth of "industrial" socialism.4
The development of doctrines of expansionist finance did not mean, of
course, that all desire to limit the size of government expenditures dis-
appeared. Criticism of the new doctrines was continuous, and further
evidence of disagreement is to be found, for instance, in the 1922 Com-
mittee on National Expenditure, which suggested (unsuccessfully) a
scheme for rationing government departments to keep expenditures in
Cf. Hubert Bland, "The Outlook," Fabian Essays in Socialism, 3rd ed., London, 1931.
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check. More important, while policy was becoming more generally
regarded as the significant matter and expenditure as its passive conse-
quence, governments still had to take account of what citizens would
tolerate by way of taxation. The important change thus lies in the govern-
ment's attitude to public expenditures, in the relaxation of its desire for
retrenchment for its own sake, and in the consequent shift in the effective
restriction of the size of public expenditures away from what the govern-
ment wished and toward what the electorate, broadened by the widening
of the franchise, would allow (by tolerating the implied tax burden).
From the 1880's, then, the notion of taxable capacity began to replace
the doctrine of retrenchment as the effective curb on government expendi-
tures. But it was a less concrete concept than retrenchment and hence a
less severe curb—particularly in that it provided no similar check upon
the upward displacement of expenditures by wars. In consequence, the
secular rate of growth of government expenditures became much faster
and continued so throughout our period. Wars, which were seen earlier
as dangerous invitations to later extravagance, now became simply the
periods in which community ideas about the tolerable burden of taxation
underwent enforced revision. As Ursula 1-licks puts it, "the high level of
taxation which can be established in wartime, almost without protest,
conditions taxpayers to permanently higher exactions."5
This revision of ideas is to be clearly seen over the period of the two
World Wars. Sir Bernard Mallet has recorded that before World War I
Sir Robert Giffen was thought by some authorities to be taking an extreme
view in suggesting that 10 per cent of national income was a reasonable
proportion to appropriate for public purposes.6 After that war, as Mallet
points out, an actual proportion of between two and three times that
size did not excite general disapproval; the famous Coiwyn Committee
of 1927, for example, took the view that "the present taxation ... isnot
one of the main causes of industrial difficulty."7
Since World War II, the proportion has approached 40 per cent, and
while (as always throughout fiscal history) there has been no lack of
complaint that the burden of taxation is too heavy, the objections have
not yet persuaded any British government drastically to reduce the scope
of its activities. It is consequently not easy to find an answer to Mallet's
wry comment that "percentages are never so convincing as practical
experience."8 During this later period, indeed, the doctrine of expan-
5UrsulaK. Hicks, British Public Finances, 1880—1952, Oxford, 1954, p. 13. See also
A. M. Cartter, Redistribution of Incomes in Post- War Britain, New Haven, 1954.
6SeeSir Bernard Mallet and C. 0. George, British Budgets, 3rd ser. (192 1—22 to 1932—
33), London, 1933, p. 464.
Report of the Committee on National Debt and Taxation, H.M.S.O., Command Paper
2800, 1927. The detailed argument is to be found in the Majority Report, paragraph 702
8Malletand George, op.cit., p.465.
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sionist finance has been further encouraged by the growing acceptance
(connected with war, as we shall later show) of government action in
directions formerly considered outside its scope, and by the encourage-
ment given to ideas of "income generating" expenditures by the interwar
depression years. Expenditure is now no longer a matter of defraying the
expenses of government; it has become an instrument of economic policy.
Finally, over the period of World War II, we find the doctrine of retrench-
ment being stood completely on its head, with the acceptance of the
"new orthodoxy"—the Keynesian doctrine which sees government
expenditure not as a source of unemployment but as a possible instrument
for its cure.
It is clear, then, that changes in government attitudes have been of
great importance in encouraging an increased rate of growth of British
public expenditures. Also, this examination of the first of the three in-
fluences singled out for study on page 63 has thrown some light upon the
second—the influence of war on the government's ability to raise revenues.
Perhaps the most reliable of economic predictions at any time is that
Citizens will dislike being asked to pay more taxes. Nevertheless, we have
seen that, once governments ceased actively to oppose the growth of
government expenditures, the views of citizens about tax burdens were
not alone enough to prevent such growth. Whenever wars effectively
destroyed existing ideas about tax burdens, the government, now that it
had a mind to, was able to increase the scope of its exactions. Also, the
changing ideas about the role of government, already referred to, affected
citizens as well as governments. Despite the ability of individuals to hold
incompatible views about the scope of government activities and about
the tolerable burden of taxes, these changing ideas can have made the
acceptance of successively higher postwar tax levels at least no more
difficult. In particular, the widening of the franchise increased the political
importance of the group most likely to believe that public expenditures
should be increased for their benefit, but that the necessary revenues
should be raised from others (the richer) by such means as progressive
taxation. Finally, revenue raising (and hence the growth of expenditures)
has been facilitated by wars in a technical fashion, by the widening of
the tax opportunities of governments and the consequent reduction of
the difficulties of expansion. The tax system, indeed, provides a special
and important instance of the "inspection effect" of war. The exigencies
of periods of crisis make possible the general revision of the tax system,
producing far-reaching permanent changes, and experimentation with
new tax sources also becomes possible. In our period, the result has been
to produce a considerable widening of the fiscal system, making taxes
easier to raise and expenditures easier to envisage. To illustrate, experience
obtained during World War I in the techniques and administrative
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problems of assessing lower income groups for income tax provided the
foundation for the permanent extension of that tax. Similarly, the pay-as-
you-earn system, through which a considerable proportion of the popu-
lation now has income tax deducted at source, was introduced during
World War II. It was also during this later period that the purchase
tax was first introduced—as a "temporary" expedient—and the revenue-
raising potentialities of the tobacco tax came to be fully appreciated.
These changes are merely illustrative and could be multiplied without
difficulty.
It remains to consider the third influence on the nature and importance
of the displacement effect, namely, the character of, and changes in,
Parliamentary institutions and organization. Continental writers have
interpreted the changes described so far as an illustration of a general
development common to many countries; they are seen as the British
manifestation of the evolution of the public sector from a "participating
system" (Anteilsystem) into a "control system" (Kontrollsystem).9 One of
the reasons suggested for this evolution, to which Schmölders in particular
pays attention, is the growth of a "favorable attitude of Parliaments
towards spending."° The position of parliaments (the representatives
of the people) vis-â-vis the governments (the executive bodies) has been
reversed, it is argued, by changes in the nature of the parliamentary
decision-taking process.In theirearlier manifestations, parliaments
operated as a brake on the tendency of the sovereigns to increase expendi-
ture. Nowadays, it is usually governments that need to try to prevçnt
parliaments from introducing spending that would necessitate additional
revenues. This is a not unrealistic description of what has happened in
Britain, although the powers of the Sovereign in money matters had been
considerably curtailed before the beginning of our period. Rather, what
has now changed is the position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in
the government, and the position of Parliament in relation to both.
British Chancellors of the Exchequer have always complained that the
House of Commons exercised its influence in favor of increasing rather
than reducing government expenditures; it is natural that the propensity
of individuals to consume public services should encourage their repre-
sentatives in Parliament to press for such services.11 So long as it persisted,
however, the doctrine of retrenchment kept this influence in check. There
See F. K. Mann, Die Staatswirtschaft unserer 2jeit, Jena, 1929, and G. Schmölders,
Finanzpolitik, Berlin, 1955, pp. 132—i 33. H. Laufenburger, Finances comparEes, Paris, 1952,
describes the evolution as from the "Etat gendarine"to the "Etat providence" and then to
the "Etatfaustien"!
10"Ausgabenfreudigkeitder Parlamente," ibid., pp. 138—139. On this point, see also Drees,
op. cit., pp. 67—69.
See D. H. MacGregor, Public Aspects of Finance, Oxford, 1939, Part I, especially
pp. 62—65.
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were few items of policy involving expenditure about which disagreement
was possible, and in such circumstances close centralized control over
the spending departments could be exercised by the permanent officials
of the Chancellor's own department, the Treasury. Indeed, in the days
of broad agreement about expenditure policy, Treasury control could
be more continuous than the governments themselves, since successive
Chancellors, even when of different parties, tended to accept the same
permanent Treasury view.12 At the same time, the Treasury and the
Chancellor stood at the center of the system of cabinet government. "It
used to be the distinguishing feature of the British administration," said
Parnell, "that the Treasury was its heart. .. theother departments were
necessarily subordinate." This placed the Chancellor in a special position,
for "the control of the Treasury is neither more or less than the personal
influence of the Chancellor upon the Cabinet."3 Such a situation, possible
while the public economy remains a participating system based upon
the doctrine of retrenchment, meets difficultiesas retrenchment is
abandoned and a widening scope of public activities (the control system)
becomes acceptable. Thus in 1919 Mr. Baldwin, Financial Secretary
to the Treasury, could point out that a minister appealing to the Cabinet
against a decision of Mr. Gladstone would have met a hostile Cabinet,
•. whichin nine cases out of ten would back the Treasury. The whole
outlook to-day is changed. .. andall large items are controlled, not by
the Treasury, but by the policy of the Government, and if the Chancellor
raises objection, and the Minister takes the matter to the Cabinet, the
natural bias will not be against the expenditure but in favour .... the
House of Commons itself would in nearly every case support the Govern-
ment which was spending the money on purposes of social amelioration."
That is, the "changed attitude of Parliaments to public spending"is
really in the case of Britain a reduction in the powers of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer to prevent such spending. Formerly those powers and
the efficacy of the Treasury control which flowed from them could render
any Parliamentary pressure for increased spending ineffective. To-day,
while the Chancellor is still one of the most important members of the
Cabinet, his prime duty is to propose the means by which the revenues
needed to implement government policies should be raised. His authority
over expenditures is limited to the support he can obtain in Cabinet
discussion.'4 As a corollary, the nature of Treasury control has altered.
It has become less concerned with "the saving of candle ends" and more
with the "efficient" allocation of resources as between public and private
12Churchill,op. cii., pp. 179—180.
'3lbid.,p. 184.
14Theresignation of Mr. Thorneycroft in early 1958 is a case in point.
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uses,'5 thus remedying the deficiency complained Of by Sir Robert
Giffen.'6 This is not to suggest, of course, that the traditional functions
of the Treasury have completely disappeared; they are still manifested,
for example, in the Treasury examination of departmental projects to be
included in the Annual Estimates so as to ensure "value for money."
But the Chancellor and the Treasury no longer have their former authority
or efficiency in curbing the growth of public spending; the only important
obstacles to such growth now are the fear of political consequences of
the concomitant need to raise more taxes, and the possible economic
(incentive) consequences of that need. Clearly, such a situation enhances
the possibility of upward displacements at times of social disturbance.'7
In the light of this review of parliamentary and social history, we turn
to the actual expenditure statistics, classified by economic and functional
categories. Clearly, we cannot hope to see the changes in social ideas, in
fiscal techniques, and in political control over spending reflected in neat
and unambiguous fashion. We must expect them to affect both the
secular behavior of expenditures and the displacement generated by
periods of social disturbance, and the precise explanation of displacement
in particular cannot be free from speculation. How far wartime displace-
ment has been in some sense the fundamental cause of expenditure growth
and how far it has operated only upon the growth's timing cannot be
determined by statistics. The most we can hope for is that the data will
lead us toward those further facts of history that are of relevance to an
understanding of the growth in British public expenditures, and it is by
its success in this that the displacement hypothesis should be judged.
Expenditure by Economic Categories
Two broad divisions of government expenditure invite examination:
expenditures on goods and services and upon transfers, and on capital
and current account.
EXPENDITURE ON GOODS AND SERVICES AND ON TRANSFERS
Not all government expenditures imply the exercise of direct claims
on the country's real resources, since some part of the expeaiditure con-
sists of transfer and subsidy payments. Consequently, a study of "resource
15SirEdward (now Lord) Bridges, in "Treasury Control," Stamp Memorial Lecture,
1950, p. 9, ascribes this change to the effects of World War I on traditional ideas about
government spending.
16 See Chapter 3, first section.
Furtherand illuminating discussion of the development of political and ideological
views in Britain, and of the changing character of British government, is to be found in
Moses Abramovitz and Vera F. Eliasberg, The Growth of Public Employment in Great
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using" and other expenditures is a useful first step toward elucidating the
residual elements of the displacement effect.
The relevant material is contained in Table 5 and Charts 11 to 14
and in Tables A-il and A- 12. From these, it is clear that the secular rate
of growth of the government's direct claims on community product (as
measured by its expenditures on goods and services) is still impressive,
if somewhat less than the rate of increase in government expenditures as
a whole. The index of money expenditures ongoods and services per
head of population rose from 43 in 1890 (1900 =100)to 381 in 1920
and 1,258 in 1955. In real terms, a similar index moves from 100in 1900
to 263 in 1955. Over the whole period, this rate ofincrease is a good deal
faster than that of GNP; the proportion of expenditure on goods and
services to GNP was 7 per cent in 1890 and 23 per cent in 1955.Further,
the statistics and Charts 11to14 also suggest that expenditure on goods
and services at least shared in the upward displacement of wars, although
CHART12
Indexes of Government Expenditure on Goods and Services, and
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it did not of course account for all of it. Government expenditure on
goods and services was taking about 7 to 10 per cent of GNP up to World
War I and 12 to 15 per cent between the two wars (until the rearmament
campaign in the late l930's which preceded the outbreak of World War
II). Since World War II, the proportion has risen to well over 20 per
cent for most of the years recorded. The effect of social disturbance upon
spending on goods and services, that is, was less marked at the period
of World War I than at that of World War II.
The reason for this contrast is to be found in the changing relative
importance of government expenditures on goods and services and on
transfers. We have already observed the great importance of transfer
payments (chiefly interest on the national debt) during the nineteenth
century. Such payments had begun to take a smaller part of total expendi-
tures, however, well before the turn of the century, as debt interest pay-
ments began to decline in relative importance. This growing importance
of spending on goods and services continued between 1890, when such
spending accounted for 74 per cent of all government expenditures, and
1900, when the proportion was 87 per cent (Table 5, Chart 13). There-
after, transfers became of rather greater significance once more; by 1913
only 81 per cent of all expenditure was for direct government consump-
tion. Following this, there was a quite marked increase in the relative
importance of transfers over the period of World War I. As against 19
per cent of total government spending going to such purposes in 1913, as
much as 45 per cent of government expenditure was for transfers in 1921
and a half of all spending was of this kind in 1923. That is, the time of
World War I saw an important growth in government activities involving
transfers, since these took less than one-fifth of all spending before the
war and around one-half after it. It is not difficult to identify some of
the kinds of expenditure that must have helped cause the change. One
cause we have observed earlier and discuss further below: debt interest
payments again became a significant part of total expenditure. But to a
considerable extent, also, the change must have been due to the great
in the coverage of unemployment insurance, from two and
one-quarter million workers before 1914 to nearly twelve million after
the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920, and to the increased scope
and higher real benefits of health insurance which became relevant
around the same time. This in turn provides an interesting commentary
upon the effects of unemployment on public expenditures. Periods of
depression may have changed social ideas, but it is after a period of war
that we see those ideas translated into effective social action.
By way of contrast, the pattern since World War II shows the share of
expenditures taken by goods and services as being similar to that of the
interwar years up to 1950, and higher and more variable thereafter.
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Certainly there has been no change comparable to that after 1918; the
displacement effect in this later period implied a general increase in the
claims of government rather than a relative growth in either transfer or
resource using activities. This difference is partly but not completely
CHART13
Percentage Distribution of Total Government Expenditure, by
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explained by the continuous full employment that Britain has experienced
since World War II, with the consequent minimization of unemployment
transfer payments.
Finally, from a secular point of view, resource-using expenditures, while
much larger in absolute size, constitute a smaller proportion of all govern-
ment expenditure at the end of our period than at the beginning.
CHART14
Indexes of Total Government Expenditure, by Economic Category,
per Head of Poputation, at 1900 Prices, 1890—1955
76
(1900=100)
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EXPENDITURE ON CURRENT AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT
Table 6 and Charts 13, 14, and 15 show that government expenditure
on current account, both in total money terms and in real terms per
head, rose during our period at a much faster secular rate than GNP.
Such expenditures were 8 per cent of GNP in 1890 and 35 per cent (in
real terms) in 1955. Chart 15 also shows clearly that the rise follows the
now familiar pattern of displacement: the share of government current
expenditures was between 8 and 11 per cent up to 1913, 22 to 26 per cent
between the wars, and 38 to 35 per cent after World War II.
Capital expenditure behaved rather differently. During the period
1900—55, when the index of real current government expenditure per
head was rising from 100 to 425, a similar index of expenditure on capital
account rose only from 100 to 152, not much faster than that of real
GNP. But the comparison is a little misleading; four years earlier the
index of capital expenditures had been 70 per cent higher, at 258. In
fact, capital expenditures followed a less regular trend than expenditures
of other types, and changes in their importance bear a less neat relation
to the incidence of wars. This is clearly brought out in Chart 13, in the
curve showing the percentages of total government expenditures devoted
to current and capital purposes.
This irregularity of capital spending suggests that expenditure on
current account explains most of the phenomenon of displacement; this
was in any case inevitable since current expenditures have at no time
accounted for less than 82 per cent of all government spending. The
irregularity of expenditure on capital account is itself not particularly
surprising. By definition, capital expenditures create durable assets,
and such expenditures must, therefore, tend to occur irregularly. Also,
the well-known phenomenon of "bunched investment" can affect public
as well as private investment, and there are two sorts of reasons for
expecting it to do so. First, the idea that spending on capital projects
might help the unemployed did not begin with Keynes, though he gave
it intellectual plausibility. The direct effects of capital spending are
obvious enough, and after the breakdown of the doctrine of retrenchment
there was no overwhelming argument against such spending. Conse-
quently, over most of our period we find growing pressure for capital
spending in time of unemployment. When such spending occurs it tends
to reduce the volume of investment spending required later. In contrast
with current relief payments in time of unemployment, for example, it is
a transfer of expenditure in time rather than a simple addition to the
total of government spending. Thus, investment spending shows a
fluctuation over time, and this may then be perpetuated by the period-
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CHARTIS
Government Expenditure on Current Account, and Gross National
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The second and perhaps less obvious possible reason for bunchiness is
to be found in the phenomenon of displacement. There is evidence that
new projects introduced over periods of displacement have their immediate
effect on the level of current expenditures, but that in course of time such
new current obligations involve the government in the need to under-
take new capital projects also. Consequently, while capital expenditures
do not follow the time pattern of other government expenditures, their
own irregularity over time is probably influenced by that pattern. The
growing problems of providing the requisite school and hospital accommo-
dation in Britain to cope with the post-World War II expansion of these
services illustrates the point.
Expenditure by Function
The discussion in Chapter 4 of one important government service—
defense—which might account for the displacement effect yielded the
conclusion that no complete explanation was possible along such lines.
This suggests that a classification of all government expenditure by
functions, apart from illuminating further the process of economic change,
is also necessary in order to provide further understanding of the influence
of war on government expenditure. In this section, then, we classify
expenditure in the following categories :18(1) general administration
(including the costs of tax collection), (2) national debt service, (3) law
and order, (4) overseas services (excluding defense), (5) military and
defense, (6) social services, (7) economic services, and (8) environmental
services.
TABLE 7
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE,BYFUNCTION AN]) ECONOMIC CATEGORIES,








1890 15.8 14.7 0.6 0.5
1900 16.5 13.6 2.0 0.9
1910 22.1 18.4 2.2 1.5
1920 71.5 64.2 4.7 2.6
1928 49.1 45.5 2.7 0.9
1933 44.3 40.9 3.0 0.4
1938 60.6 53.3 6.7 0.6
1950 175.0 118.0 18.0 39.0
1952 167.0 123.0 16.0 28.0
1955 182.0 138.0 18,0 26.0
'8The exact content of these categories is explained in the Appendix under the same
headings.
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TABLE 7 (continued)
Goodsand Services













1890 9.0 8.2 0.3 0.5
1900 9.8 9.2 0.2 0.4
1910 12.9 12.1 0.2 0.6
33.3 32.3 0.4 0.6
1928 30.8 28.7 0.4 1.7
1933 30.9 29.0 0.4 1.5
1938 38.7 35.4 2.0 1.3
1950 79.0 72.0 7.0 —
1952 96.0 85.0 10.0 1.0
1955 115.0 103.0 10.0 2.0
OVERSEAS SERVLCES
1890 0,4 0.2 0.2
1900 1.0 1.0 — —
1910 1.1 Q.9 0.2 —
1920 2.5 0.2 — 2.3
1928 1.3 0.5 0.8
1933 1.7 1.1 0.6
1938 3.0 0.7 2.3
1950 179.0 39.0 140.0
1952 77.0 40.0 37.0
1955 80.0 41.0 39.0
MILITARY AND DEFENSE
1890 34.9 32.7 1.5 0.7
1900 134.9 118.0 16.2 0.7
1910 74.3 55.5 16.5 2.3 —
1920 519.7 499.1 10.6 8.0 2.0
1928 125.1 120.5 4.1 0.5 —
1933 112.4 107.0 3.5 1.9
1938 473.2 418.6 52.2 2.4
1950 836.0 822,0 5.0 9.0
1952 1,641.0 1,469.0 155.0 17.0
1955 1,606.0 1,523.0 59.0 24.0
81ECONOMIC AND FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES
TABLE 7 (concluded)
Goods and Services
Tear Total Current Capital Transfers Subsidies
SOCIAL SERVICES
1890 27.3 17.6 1.9 7.8
1900 50.6 28.6 7.6 14.4
1910 89.1 52.4 6.6 30.1 —
1920 411.8 167.0 49.1 193.7 2.0
1928 434.8 161.2 54.3 218.8 —
1933 497.2 167.1 36.9 293.2
1938 596.3 206.7 85.8 303.8 —
1950 2,094.0 781.0 336.0 815.0 162.0
1952 2,438.0 896.0 442.0 989.0 111.0
1955 2,739.0 1,070.0 417.0 1,205.0 47.0
ECONOMIC SERVICES
1890 14.4 10.2 4.0 0.2
1900 36.4 16.4 19.8 0.2
1910 37.8 21.6 15.8 0.4 —
1920 203.2 102.7 34.0 1.9 64.6
1928 117.1 71.3 40.4 0.8 4.6
1933 111.8 66.0 34.7 0.7 10.4
1938 151.4 72.6 59.7 1.8 17.3
1950 572.0 169.0 44.0 120.0 239.0
1952 629.0 194.0 139.0 76.0 220.0
1955 531.0 220.0 68.0 44.0 199.0
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1890 5.0 3.1 1.9
1900 12.0 7.4 4.6
1910 14.5 10.9 3.6
1920 25.3 22.2 3.1 —
1928 31.9 24.2 6.8 0.9
1933 39.3 27.8 10.0 1.5
1938 51.3 35.4 12.3 3.6
1950 97.0 70.0 27.0 —
1952 120.0 83.0 37.0 —
1955 183.0 97.0 46.0 40.0
ALL SERVICES
1890 130.6 86.7 10.2 33.7
1900 280.8 194.2 50.4 36.2
1910 272.0 171.8 45.1 55.1 —
1920 1,592.1 887.7 101.9 533.9 68.6
1928 1,094.7 451.9 108.7 529.5 4.6
1933 1,066.0 438.9 88.5 528.2 10.4
1938 1,587.0 822.7 218.7 528.3 17.3
1950 4,539.0 2,071.0 437.0 1,630.0 401.0
1952 5,777.0 2,890.0 799.0 1,757.0 331.0
1955 6,143.0 3,192.0 618.0 2,087.0 246.0
For totals, see Appendix Table From 1890 to 1918
subsidies are included in transfers.
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In Table 7, the growth of expenditure by function at current prices is
illustrated, and in Table 8 the real growth per head of population.
Government expenditure, both in money terms and in real expenditure
per head of population, rose for all categories of expenditure over the
period 1890 to 1955. Moreover, as Table 9 shows, the rate of growth of
TABLE 8
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, BY FUNCTION AND ECONOMIC CATEGORIES,




rear Total Current Capital Transfers
ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER
1890 0.4 0.4 —
1900 0.4 0.3 0.1
1910 0.5 0.4 0.1
1920 0.6 0.5 —
1928 0.5 0.5
1933 0.6 0.5 —
1938 0.7 0.6 0.1
1950 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.2
1952 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.1




































1938 — — —
1950 1.0 0.2 0.8
1952 0.4 0.2 0.2
1955 0.4 0.2 0.2
MILITARY AND DEFENSE
1890 1.0 0.9 — —
1900 3.3 2.9 0.4 —.
1910 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.1
1920 4.3 4.1 0.1 0.1
1928 1.4 1.3 0.1 —
1933 1.4 1.3 0.1 —
1938 5.4 4.8 0.6 —
1950 4.5 4.4 — 0.1
195Q 7.5 6.9 0.6 0.1
1955 6.9 6.6 0.2 0.1
SOCIAL SERVICES
1890 0.7 0.5 0,1 0.2
1900 1.2 0.7 0.2 0.4
1910 1.9 1.1 0.2 0.6
1920 3.3 1.4 0.3 1.6
1928 4.8 1.8 0.6 2.4
1933 6.2 2.1 0.5 3.6 —
1938 6.7 2.4 0.9 3.5 —
1950 10.9 4.2 1.4 4.4 0.9
1952 10.8 4.2 1.5 4.6 0.5
1955 11.3 4.6 1.3 5.2 0.2
ECONOMIC SERVICES
1890 0.4 0.3 0.1 —
1900 0.9 0.4 0.5 —
1910 0.8 0.5 0.4 —
1920 1.6 0.8 0.2 0.5
1928 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.1
1933 1.4 0.8 0.5 — 0.1
1938 1.7 0.8 0.6 — 0.2
1950 3.0 0.9 0.1 0.7 1.3
1952 2.8 0.9 0.5 0.4 1.0
1955 2.1 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.9





1890 0.1 0.1 0.1
1900 0.3 0.2 0.1
1910 0.3 0.2 0.1
1920 0.2 0.2 —
1928 0.4 0.3 0.1
1933 0.5 0.3 0.1 —
1938 0.6 0.4 0.1 —
1950 0.5 0.4 0.1 —
1952 0.5 0.4 0.1 —
1955 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2
ALL SERVICES
1890 3.6 2.4 0.3 0.9 —
1900 6.8 4.7 1.2 0.9 —
1910 5.9 3.6 1.1 1.2 —
1920 12.9 7.3 0.7 4.4 0.6
1928 12.2 5.0 1.3 5.9 0.1
1933 13.2 5.4 1.2 6.5 0.1
1938 17.9 9.4 2.4 6.0 0.2
1950 23.8 11.2 1.7 8.8 2.2
1952 26.0 13.5 2.7 8.2 1.6
1955 25.7 13.8 1.9 9.0 1.1
SOURCE: For totals, see Appendix Table A- 16.
expenditure per head has been higher than that of the gross national
product for all categories except administration, whose share remained
roughly constant. This is not to say, of course, that the growth has been
regular or that its rate has been uniform for each type of expenditure.
As we see from Chart 16, the rate of growth of real expenditure per
head on national debt interest and on social services has exceeded that
for government expenditure as a whole. By the same measure, the rate
of growth of economic services has roughly kept pace with that of expendi-
ture as a whole, but the rates of growth of expenditures for military
purposes, environmental services, and law and order have been slower.
Expressing the most important of these categories as percentages of total
government expenditure, as in Chart 17 and Table 9, we observe that
social services expenditure did not fall below 30 per cent of total expendi-
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CHART16
Indexes of Total Government Expenditure, and Expenditure by
Function, per Head of Population, at 1900 Prices, 1890—1955
from war periods.'9
varied from about 25
Military
to 30 per cent of total
in peacetime
expenditure before World
War I, dropped significantly in the 1920's and 1930's to nearer 12 per
cent, but returned to well over 20 per cent after 1950. Of course, in war-
time it rose significantly, although we cannot specify a percentage for World
19Duringwartime the fall in percentage is rather misleading, because many forms of
social service, such as hospital treatment and housing, would be undertaken for the
armed forces and would appear under the category of military expenditure. All statistics
of wartime expenditures by subclassifications need Cautious handling, for similar reasons.
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over one-quarter of government expenditure in the interwar years, falling
again in the 1930's after the important conversion operations in 1932
and 1934. Despite World War II, the percentage fell in the post-1945
period. These changes reflect the greater efficiency of war finance during
World War II, and they illustrate once again why war-related expendi-
ture is not sufficient to account for the displacement effect.2° They also
help account for the greater relative importance of transfer payments in
that displacement effect over the period of World War I.
The only remaining category of significance covers economic services.
Expenditure per head in real terms for this category rose five times
between 1890 and 1955. Apart from periods of war, when such services
were reduced, and during immediate postwar periods, when reconstruc-
tion was just beginning, the percentage of total government expenditure
on such services varied very little, falling slightly over the whole period
under review.
Next to be considered is the relation between expenditures classified
by economic and by functional categories. Tables 7 and 8 give money
and real per capita expenditures by both categories. Table 9 shows
functional categories as a proportion of GNP. We find that the growth
of social services is even more marked in the case of capital as distinct
from current expenditure. In 1900, the capital expenditure on social
services was about 15 per cent of total government gross capital formation.
In 1928, it averaged 50 per cent, and reached about 67 per cent in 1955.
Capital expenditure for military purposes and for economic services
became relatively much less important; in the case of military and defense
spending, gross capital formation fell from 32 per cent of government
gross fixed capital formation in 1900 to around 9 per cent after World
War II. The economic services were the most important category so far
as government capital investment was concerned at the turn of the
century, but by 1955 they had given way to the social services, their
share in government gross fixed capital formation having fallen from
about 39 per cent to 11 per cent over the period.
In the case of transfer expenditures and subsidies, only social services
and debt interest payments are of major importance. Debt interest
payments were more than half of total transfer payments in 1900, but
less than one-third in 1955, while social services paid out around 40 per
cent of all transfers at the turn of the century but more than half the
total in 1955. We have here the explanation of the secular behavior of
expenditures on goods and services and on transfers which we described
earlier. The decline of transfers for debt interest has been offset by the
growth in transfer expenditures on social services, so that the share of
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characteristics of change. Now this final analysis (of functional and
economic categories together) takes us one step further. Complex as
the final picture is,it yet points clearly enough toward two kinds of
expenditures, which by their magnitude and evolution must have been
of fundamental importance in displacement.
The first of these is war-related and military and defense spending. It
was shown in Chapter 4 while such spending may be an important
element in displacement (as e.g., debt interest undoubtedly was over
the period of World War I), it cannot alone provide a complete ex-
planation of the phenomenon. Examining the nature of military and
defense expenditure in a little more detail will be useful here, however,
as a means of illustrating the complications that lie behind the simple
statistics of expenditure growth. At the beginning of the period under
review, aircraft had not been invented; and during World War I, they
were lightly built structures made of wooden frames powered by engines
of some forty horsepower. That the airplane was an offensive force to be
reckoned with was not demonstrated until the Spanish Civil War, and
expenditure on the Royal Air Force first assumed importance during
the rearmament campaign of 1936. By the end of World War II the
picture was altered, and with it the proportions of expenditure between
the different armed forces. Thus in 1920, 24 per cent of military expendi-
ture was for the Royal Navy, 56 per cent for the Army, and 6 per cent
for the Royal Air Force. In 1956 the percentages were 24, 33, and 30
respectively (the remaining 13 per cent representing expenditure by the
Ministry of Supply on such items as weapons research, stockpiling of
strategic raw materials).
The second group of expenditures that the analysis shows to warrant
further study is social services. The wartime displacements in social
service expenditures can be clearly seen in the statistics already given;
not much more than 4 per cent of GNP up to World War I, social service
spending accounted for at least one-twelfth of community output every
year until World War II, and after that war experienced another upward
shift, to take around one-sixth of GNP in the 1950's. The character of
this change can be seen in greater detail by considering Table 10, which
gives social service expenditures by types from 1920 on, together with the
inferences already drawn from the statistics in the earlier section of this
chapter about the period before 1920. The great increase after World
War I must have been due in part to the considerable extension of social
benefits of a "cash transfer" character (i.e., health and unemployment
benefits), so that in 1920 we find insurance and assistance accounting for
more than one-half of all social service expenditures. This proportion fell
gradually up to the Great Depression, when the stimulation of these social
transfer payments and the coincident checking or reduction in other
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TABLE 10
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL SERVICES, BY TYPE,





YearEducation HealthAssistance HousingSubsidies Total
1920 97.4 48.8 212.8 52.8 411.8
1921 106.8 55.8 227.2 100.9 490.7
1922 97.3 54.1 206.1 65.7 423.2
1923 91.4 52.2 183.2 31.9 358.7
1924 92.7 54.0 182.6 35.7 365.0
1925 97.1 56.7 185.7 49.8 389.3
1926 99.4 62.4 194.9 67.7 424.4
1927 101.9 67.1 190.3 76.7 436.0
1928 104.8 66.4 202.5 60.6 434.3
1929 108.0 69.0 207.5 53.5 438.0
1930 113.4 71.9 247.9 51.5 484.7
1931 115.7 74.3 272.8 54.0 516.8
1932 110.2 74.5 278.9 47.5 511.1
1933 107.5 75.2 268.7 45.8 497.2
1934 111.0 75.7 266.4 45.2 498.3
1935 118.3 78.8 271.4 50.7 519.2
1936 125.2 83.3 264.9 59.3 532.7
1937 131.8 90.1 262.1 70.5 554.5
1938 138.9 98.9 278.2 80.3 596.3
1950 440.0 478.0 674.0 340.0 162.0 2,094.0
1951 497.0 497.0 707.0 368.0 165.0 2,234.0
1952 552.0 510.0 825.0 440.0 111.0 2,438.0
1953 581.0 524.0 916.0 496.0 71.0 2,588.0
1954 621.0 542.0 923.0 472.0 53.0 2,611.0
1955 675.0 582.0 1,015.0 420.0 47.0 2,739.0
social service spending produced a new increase in their relative import-
ance after 1929.Thischange is perhaps typical of the behavior of transfer
and other social service payments between the wars. Their proportions
were not changing sharply as the result of new government policies or of
the operation of permanent causes, but were affected over short periods
by the "built-in stabilizer" inherent in the social insurance schemes.
Displacement over the World War II period had a different character.
The post-1945 period has been marked by a relative decline in social
security services to about one-third of total social service expenditure;
in 1954, expenditure on unemployment benefits was almost the same
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in money terms as in 1938. To-day the bulk of social insurance benefit
payments represents old-age pensions; the problem of poverty in Britain
has become that of the old rather than of the unemployed or of the prolific.
Inside the faster growing environmental social services, the most spec-
tacular increase has been in expenditure on health. During the period
1920 to 1938, expenditure on health grew at about the same rate as for all
social services, but between 1938 and 1954 expenditure in money terms
increased nearly sixfold while that for all social services only increased
about fourfold.
We have now discovered as much as possible by statistical methods
about the association of the growth in British social service expenditures
and the periods of war. It remains to seek a more qualitative answer to
the question that this association invites: Why should wars affect social
policy in such a fashion? Britain's wars since the turn of the century
have more and more affected all sections of the community, both by
way of the demands of military service and through the removal of the
front line from foreign countries to the surrounding coast and air above
the homeland. The conduct of war, therefore, has increasingly instituted
a general inspection process for the whole population and economy,
which has revealed much about social conditions. It has taken the
catastrophe of war to bring home to those in power that economic pro-
gress does not automatically disseminate the benefits of education and
health. As Titmuss has recalled, it was after the Battle of Waterloo in
1815 that Lord Brougham's committee was set up to consider "the
Educatiofl of the Lower Orders."21 The Crimean War of 1855—57 did
much to improve conditions within the military services, but it was the
Boer War of 1899—1902 that drew attention to the physical condition of
the civilian population through medical reports on servicemen. Of
course, investigators like Charles Booth, the Webbs, and later Seebohm
Rowntree had quite independently confirmed these conditions, and
Abramovitz and Eliasberg, in the companion volume on British govern-
ment employment, have stressed the role of social statistics in drawing
attention to social conditions. 22 But it has required major wars to stimulate
public opinion and obtain general consent to the extension of social
policy.
The evolution of public social services was again accelerated by the
events of World War I; as we have seen, its conclusion brought a much
wider scope of unemployment benefits and health insurance, the develop-
ment of subsidized housing schemes with the Housing Act of 1919, and
the extension of public elementary education. It is also noteworthy that
21RichardM. Titmuss, "Problems of Social Policy," History of the Second World War,
U.K. Civil Series, No. 1, London, 1950, p. 507.
22SeeAbramovitz and Eliasberg, op. cii., pp. 30—3 1.
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governments had become much more willing after World War I to
commit their successors, by the introduction of social benefits which were
payable as a right but which were to a considerable degree a charge on
the Exchequer, and of housing subsidies—those "intractable items in
the national expenditure,"23 which, even if the service were to be dis-
continued at any time, would still require liquidation over many years.
Despite warnings about growing expenditures from a succession of
Parliamentary committees, notably the Geddes Committee of 1921 and
the May Committee, the view that social services had a positive contribu-
tion to make to economic progress was too strong.24 The latter committee
was well aware that its suggested reduction in expenditure made in 1931
would be difficult to carry Out "so heavily loaded are the dice in favour
of expenditure."
Titmuss carries the story to the present day in his penetrating analysis
of the growth of social services during World War II. As he shows, the
social services during this period were an integral part of the war effort.
We must look, for example, for the birth of the National Health Service
in the aftermath of the bombing of London which brought about the
development of emergency state health measures on a large scale. We
must view the plans for reconstruction after the war, especially the
famous Beveridge Plan, as a real part of the war effort.26 Also, as our
statistics have led us to expect, the emphasis and interest in this last
period of displacement shifted away from the simple amelioration of
poverty toward that provision of specific services in kind that constitute
an important part of what is to-day popularly called the Welfare State.
We have shown the importance of the displacement effect to any
explanation of the growth of British public expenditures, and we have
now shown the importance of war-related and social service expenditures
to the explanation of displacement. It would be tempting to conclude
that, war-related expenditures apart, the wartime displacements have
23Thewords of the May Committee on National Expenditure, Command Paper 3920,
1931, p. 10.
24Therewas strong support for this view among Labour supporters in public life.
Particularly noteworthy is Dalton's Principles of Public Finance (the first edition appeared
in 1922), which criticized the negative attitude of previous British writers to public
expenditure. His views have their counterpart in the minority report to the May Com-
mittee written by two Labour supporters, Mr. Pugh and Mr. (later Lord) Latham, who
argued that the "growth in social services is a natural corollary to the development of
industry and commerce and it cannot be denied that these have profited materially from
services narrowly regarded as amenities, and it is not an overstatement of the case to
say that improved health and sanitation, better education, wider and cleaner roads,
quicker communications and even open spaces and playing fields are essential to modern
large-scale industry," Command Paper 3920, 1931, p. 226.
25Titmuss, op. Cit., Chapter XXV, passim.
26Onthis point, see also W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, "British War Economy,"
History of the Second World War, Civil Series, No. 1, London, 1949, Chapter XIX.
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been caused by the influence of wars upon social policy. Such a con-
clusion would be dangerous, in that we do not know what the level of
spending on social services would have been had the wars not occurred.
Further, we know of no statistical techniques that might throw further
light on such a question. It is obviously very difficult to trace a particular
social policy change to its exact time of origin. We have tried to make
clear our belief that we should be on very shaky ground if we ascribed
any new social service introduced after a war purely to circumstances
occurring during that war. Moreover, there is a difficulty in defining
what precisely is meant by a "new" service. In terms of organization the
National Health Service was an innovation introduced after World War
II, but it nevertheless embraces a variety of services and duties that were
part of the public sector long before it existed. Yet again, after the
wars the jump in social services expenditure often took the form, as in
unemployment benefits after World War I and sickness benefits after
World War II, of an increase in the scope and standard of service. How
great an expansion of existing services should one take to constitute
a new activity? In these circumstances, we cannot hope to carry our
statistical analysis further by an extension of the method used earlier
to eliminate war-related expenditures. We do not know what to eliminate
as being in some sense the consequence of war, and what to retain as due
to other causes. This is a difficulty that bedevils all attempts to reach
precise conclusions about cause and effect in economic life when the
"universe" under consideration involves the entire economy and the
questions to be answered are concerned with "what might have been."
We shall be content, therefore, with a more limited conclusion. It
would be difficult to deny that the climate of opinion during the twentieth
century has been increasingly favorable to the extension of public and
social services. But it would be equally foolish, in the light of our statistics,
to ignore the influence of war in actually stimulating changes both in
ideas and in actual policies. We would hope that our hypothesis of
displacement, by bringing these two influences together, has helped us
to illuminate the nature of expenditure growth as a whole and the role
of the social services therein, and in doing so has directed attention to
some neglected aspects of British fiscal history.
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